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Introduction
All developed countries have a Social Security system. However, the size of the social security systems varies across countries: in 1995, they absorbed 4.5% of GDP in the US, 5.54% in the Netherlands, 4.6% in the United Kingdom and 9% in Italy, 7.5% in France and over 7% in Germany.
There are also many different features in the design of social security systems.
Focusing on European countries, Italy, France and Germany have very high replacement rates at all levels of income, while the UK and the Dutch systems provide lower replacement rates for higher earners than for lower earners (see Disney and Johnson 2001) . This implies that the former countries have a social security system which does not redistribute within cohort, while the latter ones appear to be quite redistributive. In other words, the former countries are of a "Bismarckian" type (there is a tight link between contributions and benefits, and thus low redistribution) and the latter are "Beveridgean" (benefits are quite flat and contributions are proportional to earnings, thus redistribution is large).
Since the "Bismarckian" systems have typically a larger size, a puzzle arises.
Political economy theories of social security (see Galasso and Profeta 2002 for a review) suggest that Beveridgean systems, involving intragenerational redistribution, should enjoy larger support among low income people than Bismarckian ones, which do not entail any intragenerational redistribution, and should thus be larger.
Previous contributions to solve this puzzle in the literature of political economy models of social security are Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (1999), Cremer and Pestieau (1998) and Pestieau (1999) . However, they analyze the effect of the design of the benefit formula (Bismarckian versus Beveridgean) on the optimal size of the social security system, without explaining why a Bismarckian or a Beveridgean system with the features that we observe may arise, or they focus on the implications of the different systems for labor mobility across countries.
The aim of this paper is to provide a positive theory of the redistributive design of the social security systems which accounts for many of the different characteristics of the alternative systems, such as the benefit formula (Bismarckian or Beveridgean), the size and relevance of the second pillar.
We first perform an empirical analysis based on the data of the European Commission Household Panel (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) to confirm the existence of such a puzzle.
We divide the total population in three income groups of equal size and construct a "Beveridgean" index as the average of the differences in the replacement rates for people of different levels of income. As expected, countries that show higher values of this index (such as the UK) are associated with lower public pension expenditures, than countries that are more Bismarckian (Italy, France).
To explain this puzzle we develop a bidimensional political economy model.
In our overlapping generations model, there exist three income groups, with different access to the capital market: low income people face a lower interest rate than middle income people, who in turn face a lower interest rate than high income people. People vote contemporaneously on two dimensions of the social security system: the pension level of the low income group, and the degree of intragenerational transfer in the benefit formula. The latter feature is captured by a Bismarckian factor, α, which represents the part of the pension depending on the average earnings rather than on each individual's earning. It is well known that in a multidimensional issue space Nash equilibrium of a majoritarian voting game may fail to exist. The literature provides different alternatives to solve this problem: structure induced equilibrium, probabilistic voting, veto power or legislative bargaining and lobbying (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000) . In this paper we use the concept of structural induced equilibrium (as in Conde Ruiz and Galasso 1999 Galasso , 2000 . We show that low income people support a large, highly redistributive system (Beveridgean); middle income people favor an earning-related system (Bismarckian), while high income people oppose any public social security system, since they have access to a superior saving technology, e.g. a private system. Thus, aggregating preferences, the following equilibrium of the voting game arises. If income inequality is large, high income individuals join the low income people in a voting majority that supports a Beveridgean system, with a high level of pension for the low income individuals. The overall size of the system is however small, and a large private pillar arises. If income inequality is small, middle income people represents a majority which sustains a Bismarckian system, with a lower level of the pension for the low income people, and a larger size of the system. This leads to a smaller size of the private pillar.
These predictions are finally empirically tested. First, our calculations on ECHP data show that Beveridgean social security systems tend to guarantee higher replacement rates to low income individuals than Bismarckian ones. Second, we report data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (2000) to show that countries with Bismarckian systems have lower income inequality than Beveridgean ones. Third, we gather additional empirical evidence to show, as expected, that Bismarckian social security systems are typically associated with a smaller fraction of private pension (second pillar) than Beveridgean ones. In fact, the existence of a large public PAYG system leaves a limited space to the development of the second pillar. The majority of the elderly rely uniquely on the public pension, but the high replacement rates guarantee them a standard of living almost equal to the one they had during their working life, and thus reduces the need of complementary private pensions. Moreover, Beveridgean systems are typically associated with higher returns from the private pensions in the capital market.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section provides an empirical assessment of the "puzzle". The following sections introduce the economic environment, the voting game and the politico-economic equilibria. Finally, we empirically test the predictions of the model. All proofs are in the appendix.
Empirical Motivations
In this section we perform an empirical analysis using data form the European Commission Household Panel (ECHP) for years from 1993 to 1996 (4 waves).
The ECHP provides data on personal wage-salary earnings and pensions, together with many personal informations for a sample of individuals in the follow- t=1993, 1994, 1995, 1996) , the replacement rate is computed as the ratio of monthly pension benefits in year t (annual pension income in year t divided by the number of months during which the person was retired) and monthly earnings in year t − 1 (annual earnings divided by 12).
Pension income only includes old-age pensions, and earnings are the wage and salary earnings, net of taxes and social security contributions (with the exception of France, where income is gross 3 ). The replacement rates for the Netherlands and Sweden are not computed, since for Netherlands the monthly information on 1 For a detailed description of the ECHP data see Peracchi (2002) and Peracchi (2001, 2002) . 2 We simplify their procedure, and adopt also for intermediate years the same way to calculate the replacement ratio that they use for those retired in the first and the last year of the considered period.activity status is not available, and for Sweden the first available data are the ones of 1996 and we thus still do not have any longitudinal information in the 4 waves available to us. Pooling for each country the replacement rates for individuals retiring at any month in the considered period, our sample sizes are still quite small, ranging from a maximum of 336 observations in Italy to a minimum of 15 observations in Finland.
We then divide these observations in three income groups, taking a constant number of observations for each group and calculate the median 4 replacement rate for each income group. How the replacement rates vary across income groups depends on the country. We thus construct a "Beveridgean" index as the average between the differences of the replacement rates by income groups (difference between the replacement rate of the low and the middle income, the middle and the high, the low and the high). Table 1 shows the results. As expected, the UK and Luxembourg have a higher Beveridgean index, followed by Denmark, while
France, Italy and Spain show lower values, and they are thus more Bismarckian. 
The Economic Environment
We consider a two period overlapping generations model. Every period two generations are alive: Young and Old. Population grows at a constant rate, n > 0.
There are three types of agents (j): low, middle and high ability (j = L, M, H). 
H , which may be larger or smaller than w M .
Agents maximize a standard utility function depending only on consumption in the two periods 5 . As in Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2000), we assume that the utility function has constant elasticity of substitution between consumption in period t and period t + 1 equal to 1/γ, with γ > 1. Young agents pay a proportional tax, τ t , on their wage income and decide to save a part of their wage income for their old age. We assume that the three groups have different access to the capital market. In particular, low income people face a lower interest rate than middle income people, who in turn face a lower interest rate than high income people. This assumption reflects the imperfection in the capital market, and it allows us to differentiate the access to the private pension pillar by income groups.
We assume that the middle income group faces an interest rate which is equal or higher to the implicit average rate of return from the social security system, i.e.
in our case, to the population growth rate, while the low-income group faces an interest rate which is lower than the return from the PAYG system. Therefore, an individual of ability j who save 1 euro in period t will have a return of (1 + r j )
Old agents do not work 6 . They receive a pension transfer, whose amount could depend on their wage, as it will be specified below. We call p j t the pension awarded at time t to a j-type old agent.
The representative type-j young agent in period t solves the following problem:
subject to the individual budget constraint:
where 0 < β ≤ 1 is a factor of time preference and γ > 1 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, superscripts indicate the period when the agent was born and subscripts indicate the calendar time.
Notice that the restriction on non-negative savings (s j t ≥ 0) rules out the possibility of borrowing in youth against future pension payments. It is easy to show that the saving decision of any type-j individual yields the following condition:
where savings are increasing in the interest rate and in disposable wage income and decreasing in the pension transfer. 6 See the previous footnote.
The Social Security System
We consider a pay as you go (PAYG) social security system, in which workers contribute a fixed proportion of their labor income to the system, and the proceedings are divided among the old. Following Pestieau (1999) we assume that a type-j retired person receives a pension, p j t+1 which consists on two parts: i) a contributory part which is directly related to individual earnings, w j ; and ii) a non-contributory part which depends on average earnings, w. The system is assumed to be balanced every period, so that the sum of all awarded pensions is equal to the sum of all received contributions. Therefore, the average return from the social security system is given by the population growth rate. These properties yield the following expression for a pension received by a type-j pensioner:
The parameter α t+1 is the Bismarckian factor, that is the fraction of pension benefits that is related to contributions. As in Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau there exist an element of within cohorts redistribution, from rich to poor, which is higher the lower is the Bismarckian factor (the lower α). As in Tabellini (2000) and Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (1999), this feature can be crucial in our political game, because it may induce low ability young to support the social security system even when the average return of pensions is lower than the average return of private savings 7 , n < r L .
The PAYG social security budget constraint is the following:
In every period, the social security system can be characterized by a triple: the pension received by the low-income individuals, the payroll tax rate, and the Bismarckian factor, Once the minimum pension and the Bismarckian factor are determined, using the PAYG budget constraint, the tax rate is also fully characterized. In other words, for a given p L t+1 and α t+1 , we have that:
and the pensions for the middle and high type are respectively:
Notice that if the system is purely Beveridgean, α = 0, pensions are equal across 
The Economic Equilibrium
The following definition introduces the economic equilibrium, given the values of the social security system, which will be determined by the political game.
Definition 3.1. For a given sequence
, exogenous interest rates, • The social security budget constraint is balanced every period;
• The goods market clears every period:
The life-time utility obtained in equilibrium by a type j young agent and the remaining life-time utility for a type j old agent are represented respectively by the following indirect utility functions: 
The Political Institution
The size and composition of the social security system are determined through a political process which aggregates agents' preferences over the minimum pension,
Since the issue space is bidimensional (p L and α), Nash equilibrium of a majoritarian voting game may fail to exist. The literature provides alternative solutions 8 Specifically,
(see Persson and Tabellini, 2000) : probabilistic voting, lobbying, structure induced equilibrium, agenda setting. We adopt a majoritarian voting system and use the concept of structure induced equilibrium. This equilibrium concept is based on Shepsle (1979) and it has been used in the context of political economy models of social security by Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (1999 . As in their papers, our game is intrinsically dynamic, since it describes the interaction between successive generations of workers and retirees. We therefore use their concept of subgame perfect structure induced equilibrium 9 , which reduces the game to a dynamic issue-by-issue voting game.
Elections take place every period. All persons alive, young and old, simultaneously cast a ballot over the two dimensions separately, p L and α. Since every agent has zero mass, no individual vote could affect the outcome of the election.
We assume sincere voting. 
Voting on the minimum pension (p L )
Regardless of the composition of the social security scheme, the elderly are net recipients from the system. Therefore, for any value of α, they choose the pension transfer for the low income, p L , that maximizes their pension, which is clearly the
Today's young individuals may be willing to vote in favor of the pension system, and thus to bear the cost of a current transfer, if their vote will also determine its future size, and thus their future benefits. In the game with commitment, a type-j young individual choose her vote, p L j , by maximizing her indirect utility function with respect to a constant sequence of minimum pensions,
The following proposition summarizes the voting decision of any young individual.
a young type-j prefers to use only the social security technology to transfer resources to the future (and thus chooses not to save, s j t = 0), and he votes for the following level of pension for the low-income individuals:
a young type-j prefers to use only the private saving technology to transfer resources to the future (s j t > 0) and he votes for p
The intuition of the previous result is the following: if the rate of return of his saving technology, (1 + r j ), is higher that the rate of return of the social security system in place, (1+n)(α+(1 − α) w/w j ), a type-j worker would prefer to transfer resources to the future using the private saving technology rather than the social security system. Thus, in this case he will prefer a zero minimum pension and positive savings. Otherwise, he will choose a positive minimum pension and no private savings.
Notice that the young individual's vote depends on the structure of the social security system: i) if the system is purely Bismarckian (α = 1), then a young individual type-j votes for a positive minimum pension if r j ≤ n; and ii) if the system is purely Beveridgean (α = 0) then a young individual type-j votes for a positive minimum pension if w j (1 + r) < w(1 + n).
>From the previous proposition it follows that low-income individuals always prefer the social security system to transfer resources to the future, since we have assumed that their rate of return from private saving is lower than the return from the PAYG system (r L < n) and w L < w. Hence, condition 4.1 is satisfied and low income individuals vote for a positive level of pension for themselves, according to equation 4.2. On the other hand, high-income individuals always prefer the private saving technology to transfer resources to the future (condition 4.3 is always satisfied, since r H ≥ n and w H > w) and they vote for zero minimum pension. The voting behavior of the middle group is instead ambiguous, since it depends on the degree of redistribution (α) and on the performance of the social security system relative to those of the assets that they may access on the capital market (r M versus n).
The result of the next corollary is crucial to obtain an ordering of the votes over p L .
This corollary points out that if an individual prefers to use the social security system as a saving device, the higher is his wage, the higher is his most preferred minimum pension. The intuition is straightforward: richer individuals want to move more resources into the future and therefore, since they use the social security system as their only saving technology, they prefer higher pensions than lower income agents 12 . This corollary thus implies that if the type-M individuals are willing to join the low-income individuals in supporting the social security system, they vote for higher pension than the low type young.
The following proposition identifies the median voter in the jurisdiction p L for a given level of α.
Proposition 4.3. The median voter over the jurisdiction p L is:
This proposition suggests that, when the middle income individuals prefer social security as a saving device (case i), their private returns being "low" (see 
Voting on the Bismarckian factor
The old have again a simple choice. Since they are no longer required to contribute to the system, they vote for the Bismarckian factor that maximizes their current transfer for a given level of p L . Clearly, low type old are indifferent on this dimension, because their final pension, p L , is fixed. Middle and high income old vote for α = 1 (a purely bismarckian system), since, for a given minimum pension, a Bismarckian system maximizes their pension transfers:
We now turn to the young. Because of the assumption of commitment over the social security policies, the voting decision of an ability type j young individual amounts to maximizing her indirect utility (eq. 3.8) with respect to current and future bismarckian factors, α t = α t+1 = α, for a given value of current and future minimum pensions, p
To appreciate the voting behavior of the young, notice that, for a given value of p L , an increase in the Bismarckian factor has a double effect: it raises the pensions to the middle and high types (see 
Low types clearly prefer a Beveridgean system, which, for a given p L , reduces their wage bill.
High income types are net contributors in a Beveridgean system that redistributes within cohorts. Nevertheless, they are willing to sustain a Beveridgean system (α = 0) if the return on their private assets is sufficiently high. The intuition is straightforward: a Beveridgean system reduces their pension transfer, but also their contributions, which may more conveniently be invested in a private asset. This represents a crucial insight of the model, and suggests that alternative saving opportunities may be relevant in shaping the individual preferences over the social security system. If, on the other hand, the return on private asset is not high enough, high income savers choose a Bismarckian scheme 13 .
Middle-types' voting behavior resambles the high types' if their wage exceeds the average wage (w M > w), despite the fact that they enjoy a lower private return, r M < r H . On the other hand, for w M < w, (and r M ≥ n), the middle types always prefer a Beveridgean system, from which they are net recipients.
It is worth noticing that, as long as the old do not constitute a majority of voters, the maximum level of low type pension that may be voted, p In what follows, we concentrate on the case of high private returns for the high types. In other words, we assume that
, and thus high type young support a Beveridgean system. The alternative case is analyzed in the appendix A.6.
Using the results in the previous proposition, the median voter in the jurisdiction α for a given level of p L is:
• a young individual, and α = 0,
a high or low-type young and α = 0,
• a middle type young who votes α = 1,
Under the assumption that high types young obtain sufficiently high returns on private assets, a Beveridgean system is always supported by a coalition of the extreme: low and high types young. Thus, if they constitute a voting majority or if they are joined by the middle-type young, a Beveridgean system arises. If, on the other hand, they do not constitute a majority, and the middle type young oppose a Beveridgean system, a Bismarckian system arises.
The Political Economy Equilibrium
The previous sections have separately analyzed the voting behavior of all individuals along the two dimensions of the issue space, i.e., the minimum pension and the bismarckian factor, under the assumption of commitment. Since preferences are single peaked, we can now apply Shepsle's (1979) result, and characterize the structure induced equilibria of the game with commitment. The next proposition characterizes the politico-economic equilibrium outcomes of our voting game. A. If w M < w:
The proposition shows that a Beveridgean system will always arise when the middle group has a wage lower than the average wage. However, the interesting result is that even when w M ≥ w, a Beveridgean system will be an equilibrium as long as both high and middle income groups have sufficiently high returns from private savings (larger than the threshold (1 + n) w Additional results arise when we focus on the capital market. Interestingly, the equilibrium system may be Bismarckian only if the interest rate for the middle income is lower than the threshold (1 + n) w
the interest rate of the middle income is higher than this threshold, the system is Beveridgean. In other words, when the capital market is more efficient and provides higher returns, it is more likely to have a Beveridgean system. This result delivers an additional testable prediction: a PAYG Beveridgean system is associated with a larger private pillar, which yields higher returns.
The next Corollary delivers an additional empirical predictions and finally explains the "puzzle".
Corollary 4.6 shows that a Beveridgean system is associated with a higher pension for the low-income individuals and a lower size of the PAYG system (a lower tax rate) than a Bismarckian. The last result resolves the "puzzle", i.e., our bidimensional political economy model of social security explains the association between a higher Bismarckian factor and a higher level of PAYG social security case of commitment, will now be willing to enter an "implicit contract" among successive generations of voters to sustain the welfare state. This "implicit contract" specifies that, if current young support the existing welfare system, they will be rewarded with a corresponding transfer of resources in their old age, or they will be punished, and receive no transfers.
Testing the Empirical Predictions
In this section we aim at testing the following empirical predictions, implied by the model:
1. The more "Bismarckian" a system is, the lower is the pension of the low income people 2. The more "Bismarckian" a system is, the lower is the income inequality in the country 3. The more "Bismarckian" a system is, the lower is the private pension pillar. Table 3 shows that according to our calculations on the ECHP data, countries with a higher Beveridgean index are associated with a higher replacement rate for low-income individuals, both calculated as the replacement rate of the bottom 33% and the bottom 20%. We interpret this as evidence that more Beveridgean systems offer a higher pension to low income individuals, as suggested by our model. Supplementary pensions represent the 28% of the total pension in the UK, and only the 2% in Italy. These data are consistent with our third prediction, that the second pillar is much more developed in Beveridgean countries, where the public pillar is smaller, than in Bismarckian countries, where the public pension offers very large amounts. 
Conclusions
This paper extends previous contributions by Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau Bismarckian systems tend to be associated with lower inequality and with a lower size of the private pillar. The explanation is very intuitive: in an economy with three income groups, low-income people support a large, redistributive system; middle-income favor an earning-related system, while high-income people oppose any public system, since they have access to a superior saving technology, e.g. a private system. If income inequality is large, high and low-income people form a voting majority which supports a (small) Beveridgean system, and a large private pillar may arise; if income inequality is small, middle-income and elderly people represent a majority which sustains a (large) Bismarckian system and the private pillar turns out to be small. Additionally, we show that when capital market is more efficient and provides higher returns, it is more likely to have a Beveridgean system.
The analysis could be extended in several ways. First, using our theoretical framework, one may ask how reforms in the degree of redistributiveness of the public PAYG system may affect the development of the private pension schemes.
As a policy implication, the results of the model suggest that in order to reduce their public pension expenditures, Bismarckian countries should encourage the development of the second pillar. However, we showed that this outcome is associated with a more redistributive system, which guarantees higher replacement rates to lower income individuals. We thus expect that recent reforms, like the Italian reform of 1995, introducing the (notional) defined contribution method, and thus a closer link between contributions and benefits, and no redistribution, would imply a system where the role of the second pillar remains marginal. Second, the data collected in this analysis and the predictions of the model suggest that the pension systems in European countries differ in many aspects. What role will current policies, such as the harmonization of the pension systems in a European context, have on the differences between european pension systems?
Do we expect european countries to react differently to current common trends, such as the aging process? These questions suggest directions for future research.
A. Appendix
A.1. The Voting Game and the Notion of Equilibrium
In this appendix, we define the voting game and formalize our concept of equilibrium: the stationary subgame perfect structure induced equilibrium. We consider that voters may only determine the current minimum pension and the current Bismarckian factor, although they may expect their vote to condition future voters'
decisions. We define the voting game with no commitment as follows.
The public history of the game at time
, is the sequence of social security minimum pensions and Bismarckian factor parameters until t − 1, where H t is the set of all possible history at time t. An action for a type j young individual at time t is a pair of social security minimum pension and Bismarckian factor parameter, a
Analogously, an action for a type j old individual at time t is
. Thus, at time t every voter chooses a pair
We identify with a t the action profile of all individuals (young and old) at time t: The history of the game is updated according to the outcome function; at time
For a given sequence of action profiles, (a 0 , ..., a t , a t+1 , ...), and their corresponding realizations, 
nd a type b j old individual, at time t, maximizes the following function
here, according to our previous definition of the outcome function,
re, respectively, the median among the actions over the two parameters of the social security system played at time t and t + 1.
We can now define a stationary subgame perfect structure induced equilibrium of the voting game as follows:
is a Stationary Subgame Perfect Structure Induced Equilibrium (SSPSIE) if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
(ii) At every time t, the equilibrium outcome associated to σ is a Structure Induced Equilibrium of the static game with commitment over future policy.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 4.1
A worker type-j chooses a level of p L j which maximizes his indirect utility function v 
Therefore, an individual will be in favor of a zero minimum pension if the above condition is negative, i.e. if 1+r j > (1+n) 
Just notice that the following expression is positive if γ > 1 dp L j 
The high type and the low type young prefer a lower minimum pension than the old and the middle type young. In this case if the low and the high types young constitute a majority in the total population the median voter will be a low type young, otherwise the median voter will be a middle type young.
, that is the high type and the middle type young prefer a lower minimum pension than the old and the low type young. In this case if the middle and the high types young constitute a majority in the total population, the median voter will be a middle type young, otherwise the median voter will be a low type young.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4.4.
First notice that, for a given p L , an increase in α increases the tax rate (from equation 3.6):
and increases the middle and high type's pensions (from equations 3.7):
Thus, the effect on the indirect utility function of a low type (see equation 3.8) of an increase in α is always negative (for a given p L ) and hence they vote for α = 0.
For low and high type savers, s * ,j > 0, by the envelop theorem, we can concentrate on the effect on the lifetime income (indicated by I j ):
It is easy to see that ∂I j ∂α is negative, and hence α j = 0, for (1 + r j ) ≥
, otherwise α = 1. Notice that for w M < w the ratio on the RHS of the previous inequality is less than one, and thus the inequality is always satisfied, since r M ≥ n. This implies that for w M < w, α M = 0.
Non-savers are at a corner solution in their saving decision, and thus the envelop theorem does not apply. In particular, they would like to borrow against future pension wealth to transfer resources into the present. Analytically,
For middle and high type non-savers, the choice of α amounts to maximize the following expression:
Using A.1, it is easy to see that the previous FOC is always negative, and hence
. However, now reversing the previous inequality does not imply that α j = 1. Therefore, in the proposition we characterize the condition for middle and high types to vote α = 1 for savers only, i.e., when β (1 + r j ) > In this case, the median voter over α is:
• a middle or high type young, and α = 1, if (1 + r
• a high type young, and α = 1, if
• a middle type young, and α = 0, if 
A.8. Proof of Corollary 4.6
The minimum pension under a purely beveridgean and purely bismarckian system are the following:
The purely beveridgean and purely bismarckian tax rates are the following:
(1 + n) re also subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the game described in the appendix A.1. 
